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* Sapienza University of Rome 
+ Bank of Italy    1 Introduction1
Substantial changes in the correlation structure of U.S. macroeconomic series
accompanied the downward shift in the volatility of output in the mid-1980s,
which has been described as ￿the Great Moderation￿ .2 Gal￿ and Gambetti
(GG hereafter) (2009) estimate a structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
with time-varying coe¢ cients and provide evidence of a signi￿cant shift in
the patterns of unconditional and conditional comovements among output,
hours, and labor productivity as well as in the impulse responses to identi￿ed
shocks.
Whether the volatility break and the large changes in the pattern of con-
ditional and unconditional second moments experienced by the U.S. economy
have a common underlying explanation is an open question. In this paper, we
claim that some relevant developments in the design of labor compensation
represent the common source of the drop in output volatility and the shift in
the structure of conditional and unconditional correlations between output,
hours and labor productivity.
The literature documents two major changes in the US wage setting at
around mid-80s. The ￿rst one is an overall reduction in the degree of real
wage rigidities. For instance, Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007b) and Blanchard and
Riggi (2009) emphasize the role of increased wage ￿ exibility in accounting
for the decrease in the macroeconomic e⁄ects of oil shocks. And Gal￿ and
van Rens (2010) detect a notable rise in the volatility of the real wage char-
acterizing post-war U.S. dynamics, which contrasts with the parallel decline
in output volatility.
1We thank Olivier Blanchard, Efrem Castelnuovo, Luca Gambetti, Gian Maria
Milesi-Ferretti, Salvatore Nistic￿, Pau Rabanal, Giorgio Rodano, an anomimous
referee and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the University of Rome Tor
Vergata, the University of Padua and the CEPR-CREI Workshop on ￿Changes
in Labor Market Dynamics￿at Universitat Pompeu Fabra for helpful suggestions
and discussions. Part of this project was completed while Marianna Riggi was a
visiting scholar at the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund.
The hospitality therein is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here do
not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Bank of Italy. Any errors are our own.
2The Great Moderation was ￿rst documented by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell
and Perez-Quiros (2000), who estimate a break year of 1984 for the volatility of US GDP.
An overview of the evidence and its explanations is provided by Blanchard and Simon
(2001) and Stock of Watson (2002), who emphasize that the decline in volatility was
experienced also in the other G7 countries.
5The second striking fact is the substantial increase of ￿rms￿ reliance
on pay-for-performance mechanisms after the early 1980s. Lemieux et al.
(2009), for example, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), document that the incidence of performance-pay jobs among salaried
workers has risen from about 30 percent in the late 1970s to nearly 50 percent
in the late 1990s. Moreover, on the basis of an annual survey of Fortune 1000
corporations, they calculate that the fraction of workers with some forms of
performance-pay increased from 20.7 percent in 1987 to 44.5 percent in 2002.
Mitchell et al. (1990) point to a signi￿cant shift towards adoption of incen-
tive pay plans in the 1980s, after a period following the end of World War II
to 1979 which was characterized by a decline in their use3. Importantly, the
growing reliance on these compensation schemes has a⁄ected workers in gen-
eral (Prendergast, 1999) and the increased share of performance-related pay
in workers average earnings is associated with an increase in the estimated
performance-pay sensitivity.4
We argue that the increased ￿ exibility of real wages associated with a
higher proportion of performance-related pay in workers average earnings
may account for most of the results uncovered by GG (2009). We demon-
strate this claim through a Dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model which
includes work e⁄ort as an additional dimension of ￿rms￿and households￿
choices. Using stochastic simulations, we ￿nd that, on its own, this shift in
the design of workers pay yields the following implications:
￿ A vanishing procyclical response of labor productivity to non-technology
shocks.
￿ A shrinking contractionary e⁄ects on hours worked of positive technol-
3Similarly, Hall and Liebman (1998) show that the responsiveness of pay to performance
for chief executive o¢ cers increased after the early 1980s. Jensen and Murphy (1990)
estimate low pay-performance sensitivity for top executives in the 1970s to the mid 1980s.
4Cuæat and Guadalupe (2005 and 2008) show that the increased responsiveness of pay
to performance originates from the trend towards increased product market competition,
that induced ￿rms to re-shape the structure of the incentives to reward workers, making
performance-related pay schemes more pervasive. Another explanation for the higher inci-
dence of these pay systems is based on the extensive development of performance appraisal
systems, due to progress in information and monitoring technologies which provided im-
proved worker performance measures. Lemieux et al. (2009) discuss these advances and
point to the extraordinary expansion over the last 30 years of consulting companies spe-
cializing in compensation.
6ogy shocks.
￿ A dramatic decline in the procyclicality of labor productivity measured
by a notable drop in the unconditional correlation between labor pro-
ductivity and output as well as by a sign switch in the unconditional
correlation with hours, from positive to large negative values.
￿ A sizeable drop in output volatility, i.e. a great part of the "Great
Moderation".
These predictions closely correspond to the empirical ￿ndings of GG
(2009) on the shift in the structure of conditional and unconditional sec-
ond moments of U.S. macroeconomic series between the pre-1984 period and
the post-1984 period.
By contrast, we show that if the higher wage responsiveness to the busi-
ness cycle had been associated with a lower relative share of performance
pay in workers average earnings, the changes in the patterns of conditional
and unconditional correlations would have been exactly the opposite to those
reported by GG (2009) in their empirical analysis.
We also investigate whether a structural change in the labor market
through a generalized fall in the adjustment costs of labor, rather than
through a change in the design of compensation, is conducive in our model to
shifts in the pattern of comovements that resemble the empirical ones.5 We
show that while it may explain the lower procyclicality of labor productivity,
it yields predictions that are at odds with the observed changes in the hours
response to technology shocks. Of course, we do not rule out the potential
relevance of this and other alternative explanations of the Great Moderation.
However, our paper emphasizes that the developments occurred in the design
of labor compensation, leading to a higher relevance of performance-related
pay in the cyclical ￿ uctuations of wages, have played a key role in explaining
the enhanced macroeconomic stability and the parallel shift in the structure
of macroeconomic correlations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides evidence on the large
changes in the structure of the correlations among output, hours and produc-
tivity associated with the Great Moderation. Section 2 presents the theoreti-
cal model. Section 3 discusses the implications of the change in the structure
5This interpretation is suggested by Barnichon (2007), Gal￿ and van Rens (2010) and
GG (2009).
7of labor compensation for the impulse responses to identi￿ed shocks, for the
comovements among output, hours and labor productivity and for output
volatility. Section 4 analyzes the macroeconomic consequences of a drop in
labor adjustment costs and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Anatomy of the Great Moderation
GG (2008) analyze the correlation structure of U.S. output, labor produc-
tivity and hours over the Post-WWII period, and document a dramatic shift
in the patterns of conditional and unconditional second moments of these
macroeconomic series with the onset of the Great Moderation. Most of their
evidence is obtained by estimating a SVAR with time-varying coe¢ cients
and stochastic volatility. The model is bivariate and includes (￿rst di⁄er-
ences of the logarithm of) labor productivity and (the log level of) hours per
capita. Technology shocks are identi￿ed using long-run restrictions as in Gal￿
(1999): the unit root in labor productivity originates uniquely in technology
innovations so that only the latter have permanent e⁄ects on productivity.
A number of empirical ￿ndings arise from their analysis and the major ones
are the following.
Changes in conditional correlations The correlation of labor produc-
tivity with both output and hours conditional on technology and non - tech-
nology shocks shows large changes since the mid-1980s which are re￿ ected
in the impulse responses to identi￿ed shocks and can be summarized in two
empirical results.
First, while in the pre-Great Moderation period labor productivity re-
sponds positively and signi￿cantly to non-technological innovations, display-
ing a pro-cyclical pro￿le, in the more recent sub-period the response of labor
productivity is negative and labor productivity becomes countercyclical con-
ditional on non - technology shocks. Second, in the pre-Great Moderation
period the e⁄ect of a technology shock on hours is negative and signi￿cant,
while in the post-1984 period the e⁄ect, albeit still negative, is smaller (in
absolute value) and almost reaching zero6. Figures 1a and 1b summarize
6The e⁄ect on impact of technology shocks on labor input is a rather controversial issue
in the literature. On empirical ground, Gal￿ (1999) and Basu et al. (2006), among many
others, document a negative correlation between labor productivity and hours conditional
on technology shocks. They use di⁄erent identi￿cation methods: long run restrictions
8the bulk of this evidence. The ￿rst panel deals with the average responses
of labor productivity to a non-technology shock in the pre-1984 and post-
1984 periods. The second panel documents the average responses of hours
to technology shocks in the two periods.
Changes in unconditional correlations As for the changes in uncondi-
tional correlations, GG (2009) use Band-Pass (BP) ￿ltered data and report
a dramatic fall in the cyclical behavior of labor productivity. The uncon-
ditional correlation between labor productivity and output becomes close
to zero in the post-84 sample period while it was 0.61 in the pre-84 pe-
riod. By using hours worked as the cyclical indicator, labor productivity
becomes a countercyclical variable as the unconditional correlation between
labor productivity and hours changes from 0.18 to -0.46. Consistently with
GG, Barnichon (2007) ￿nds that the sign of the correlation between cyclical
unemployment and the cyclical component of labor productivity switched in
the mid-80s: from negative it became positive. Stiroh (2009) con￿rms that
the increased output stability in the US re￿ ects a signi￿cant decline in the
correlation between labor productivity growth and hours growth.
Changes in volatility As for the changes in unconditional volatilities,
GG document that the standard deviation of output drops from 2.59 in
the pre-84 period to 1.23 in the post-84 period and that the decline in the
standard deviation of hours and labor productivity is not as large as that
experienced by output. On the other hand, Gal￿ and van Rens (2010) ￿nd
in the former case, a direct measure of technology change derived through a growth ac-
counting approach in the latter case. The ￿nding of a contractionary e⁄ect of technology
improvements has been questioned along several dimensions. Christiano et al. (2003)
argue that it originates from a speci￿cation error due to over-di⁄erencing of hours worked:
if hours (per capita) are assumed to be a stationary variable and their level is used in
the VAR analysis, then hours worked would rise, rather than fall, in the aftermath of a
technology improvement. Chari et. al (2008) take the stand that Gal￿￿ s (1999) result is
potentially ￿ awed by small-sample bias. In response to these criticisms, Fernald (2007)
shows that once one allows for (statistically and economically plausible) trend breaks in
productivity, the treatment of hours is relatively unimportant and hours fall sharply on
impact following a technology improvement. Francis and Ramey (2005) provide arguments
supporting the unit root hypothesis for per capita hours. Indeed, the impulse response
functions from the model with stationary hours indicate that non-technology shocks have
long-lived signi￿cant e⁄ects on labor productivity contrary to the fundamental identifying
assumption.
9that the standard deviation of both the product and consumption wages has
increased by, respectively, 40 and 10 percent in the post-84 sample compared
to the previous sub-period.
The complex picture that emerges from these ￿ndings challenges the
"good luck" view of the Great Moderation and suggests that the US econ-
omy has witnessed more than a mere scaling down of the size of shocks. In
what follows, we argue that the increased output stability and the shifts in
the pattern of macroeconomic correlations have a common source which is
related to the important changes occurred in the structure of labor pay.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a DNK model with variable labor e⁄ort. Model
features can be summarized as follows:
￿ Given our objectives, we assume that there are two sources of ￿ uctu-
ations in the economy: a technology and a non-technology shock. We
characterize the nature of the shocks in accordance with the empirical
analysis by GG, whose ￿ndings we seek to explain. In particular, we
assume that the exogenous productivity factor has a unit root and is
thus non-stationary in levels so that a technology shock a⁄ects pro-
ductivity in the long-run. On the contrary, we assume a stationary
process for what we call the non-technology shock and characterize it
as a preference shock, as in Gal￿ and Van Rens (2010).
￿ E⁄ective labor input used by ￿rms is a function of hours worked and
e⁄ort exerted.
￿ Following Gal￿ (1999), we split labor compensation in two components:
the one rewarding hours and the one rewarding performance. Moreover,
along the line of Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007a and 2010), we introduce
ad hoc rigidities in the labor compensation.
￿ We introduce hours adjustment costs, which, while not needed for the
intuition behind our argument, allow us to shed light on how far we can
go by assuming a more ￿ exible labor market, which implies a decrease
10in ￿labor hoarding￿ , without any changes in the structure of labor
compensation.7
3.1 Households
We consider a continuum of households uniformly distributed on the unit






t￿t fU[Ct (j);Ct￿1] ￿ g[Ht (j);Et (j)]g; (1)
where Ct (j) is household j￿ s consumption in period t of the usual Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregate of goods with elasticity of substitution ￿, Ct￿1 is the ag-
gregate consumption level in period t ￿ 1, the function g(:) measures the
disutility from work, which depends on hours Ht and e⁄ort exerted Et and
￿ is the discount factor; ￿t is a preference disturbance term with mean unity
which follows the stationary ￿rst order autoregressive process





t are zero-mean, i.i.d. innovations. We assume a speci￿cation of the
period utility consistent with the balanced growth path:
U[Ct (j);Ct￿1] ￿ log[Ct (j) ￿ hCt￿1]; (3)
where h 2 [0;1) denotes the degree of external habit formation. Follow-
ing Bils and Cho (1994) and Barnichon (2007), we assume that the period
disutility of labor takes the form:











where ￿h, ￿e, ￿h, and ￿e are positive constants.
The period budget constraint, conditional on the optimal allocation of
expenditures among di⁄erent goods, is given by:
PtCt + QtBt = WtHt + VtEt + Bt￿1 + ￿t; (5)
7The presence of labor hoarding is a common explanation for the procyclicality of labor
productivity and the ensuing short run increasing returns to labor (SRIRL) puzzle.
11where Pt is the price level, Qt is the price of a one-period nominally riskless
bond, paying one unit of money and Bt is the amount of that bond purchased
in period t. As in Gal￿ (1999), Wt and Vt represent the nominal prices of
one hour￿ s work (nominal hourly wage hereafter) and of a unit of e⁄ort,
respectively, where the latter represents our measure of performance pay. ￿t
denotes the households￿pro￿ts from ownership of ￿rms.


































= (Ct ￿ hCt￿1)￿eHtE
￿e
t : (8)
Equations (7) and (8) are the perfectly competitive hour and e⁄ort supply
schedules, respectively. We relax the assumption of perfect competition in
the labor market along the lines suggested by Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007a,
2007b and 2010), by introducing ad hoc rigidities into the compensation
structure, which prevent the cyclical components of both W r
t and V r
t from
fully adjusting to their competitive counterparts. In particular, let us detrend
W r
t and V r









At denote the cyclical components of the hourly real wage and
the real price of e⁄ort, respectively. We then replace equations (7) and (8)
with the following hourly wage and performance pay curves, which, together,






























where the parameters ￿e and ￿h measure the sensitivity of worker￿ s pay to
the business cycle. The lower are ￿e and ￿h the higher is the responsiveness
of labor compensation to economic conditions.
12Changing ￿h and ￿e, however, changes both the degree of cyclicality of
labor compensation as well as the stationarized steady state values of its two
components: f W r and f V r. In general, an increase in the ￿ exibility of labor
compensation may leave unchanged the shares of performance pay and hourly
pay in workers average earnings or, conversely, it may be associated with a
change in the relative importance of the two compensation margins in workers
average earnings. Indeed, for a given value of ￿h, a decrease in ￿e captures a
higher ￿ exibility of labor compensation associated with a higher relevance of
performance pay in the cyclical ￿ uctuations of labor compensation, i.e., with
a higher share of e⁄ort-related pay in worker￿ s average earnings,
￿
f V r
g Wr+f V r
￿
.
Conversely, for a given value of ￿e, a decrease in ￿h re￿ ects a higher ￿ exibility
of labor compensation associated with a higher relevance of hourly pay in the
cyclical ￿ uctuations of labor compensation, i.e., with a higher share of hourly
pay in worker￿ s average earnings,
￿
g Wr
g Wr+f V r
￿
. Thus, the parameters ￿e and
￿h a⁄ect the degree of responsiveness to economic conditions of the cyclical
components of the two remuneration margins as well as their relative shares
in workers average earnings.
3.2 Firms
We distinguish between two sectors: retail and wholesale ￿rms. Households
are employed by wholesale ￿rms which face convex costs of varying their
hours input and operate in a competitive market in relation to the goods
they produce. Wholesale ￿rms sell their output to retailers, which are mo-
nopolistically competitive and set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo
(1983). The separation of the two sectors is a modelling strategy which aims
at providing a convenient separation of the two frictions (hours adjustment
costs and price stickiness) in the model.
3.2.1 Wholesale ￿rms






13where ￿ 2 (0;1] and Ljt denotes the e⁄ective labor input de￿ned as a
function of hours and e⁄ort:8
Ljt = HjtEjt; (12)
and At was de￿ned earlier as the productivity factor common across ￿rms.
We assume a trending nonstationary process for the technology level, At,
to be consistent with the identi￿cation approach in GG which assumes that
only technology shocks have a permanent e⁄ect on the level of productivity.
Following Altig et al. (2005) and Gertler et al.(2008), we assume that Zt ￿
At
At￿1 obeys the following exogenous stochastic process:
logZt = (1 ￿ ￿a)log￿a + ￿a logZt￿1 + "
a
t; (13)
where ￿a de￿nes the constant growth rate and "a
t is the i.i.d. technology
shock.
Each ￿rm j varies its hours input by facing convex costs, which are in-
creasing with the speed of the desired adjustment and are measured in terms










where ￿h ￿ 0 is the hours￿adjustment cost parameter. The adjustment cost
function implies that ￿rms have an incentive to make gradual changes to
hours which result in an intertemporal smoothing of their demand for hours.












subject to (11), where ￿jt = 1
￿tY w
jt ￿ Wt






and ￿t = Pt
Pw
t is the markup of retail over wholesale prices. The ￿rst order













































symmetric equilibrium Hj;t = Ht and Ej;t = Et for all j, since all wholesale
￿rms are identical and make the same decisions.
3.2.2 Retailers
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers, indexed
by i on the unit interval. The retail ￿rm purchases the wholesale output






t (i) is the quantity of the (single) wholesale good.
Following Calvo (1983), retailers can reset their price at random dates:
in each period only a randomly chosen fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of retailers adjusts
their prices. The remaining retailers keep their prices unchanged. Let P ￿
t





























where MCt+k=t denotes the real marginal cost in t+k for a ￿rm that last reset









Pt+k. Assuming that hours￿adjustment costs












The model is closed by a monetary policy rule. We assume that monetary
policy obeys a simple Taylor rule, in which the nominal interest rate reacts










where R is the steady state nominal gross rate and ￿￿ and ￿y are parameters.
3.4 The stationary representation of the model
The non-stationary technology process induces a stochastic trend in Ct, Yt,
W r
t and V r
t . To obtain the stationary representation of the model, the non-
stationary variables are rescaled by the level of technology: e Xt = Xt
At, where
Xt is a generic variable and e Xt its corresponding stationary ratio (see e.g.
Gertler et al., 2008, Juillard et al., 2008 and Smets and Wouters, 2007). The
detrended model is then log-linearized around the balanced growth steady
state. The complete system of log-linear equations in stationary form is the
following:
1. Technology







(e ct￿1 ￿ zt) + 1
1+ h
￿a







it ￿ Et￿t+1 + Et￿log￿t+1
￿
9Market clearing for good i requires AtL￿
i;t = Ct(i): Integrating over i yields AtL￿
t =
R 1
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t ￿ e yt + ht + ￿
￿￿1
￿h
￿ (ht ￿ ht￿1) ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿h
￿ (Etht+1 ￿ ht)
i
6. Aggregate Resource Constraint
e yt = e ct
7. E¢ cient Price Frontier
e vr
t = e wr
t ￿ et + ht + ￿
￿￿1
￿h
￿ (ht ￿ ht￿1) ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿h
￿ (Etht+1 ￿ ht)
8. Monetary policy rule
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿ye yt
In the following section, we conduct stochastic simulations in order to
investigate the implications for macroeconomic correlations of a structural
change in the design of labor compensation.
4 The role of Performance-related Pay
This section establishes that the higher ￿ exibility of labor compensation,
coupled with a higher share of performance-related pay in workers average
earnings, does explain most of the empirical evidence summarized in section
2. In order to pin down the role of changes in the US design of labor com-
pensation, we ￿x all the model￿ s parameters except ￿e and investigate if an
increasing relevance of performance-related pay in the cyclical ￿ uctuations
of labor compensation can account for the observed shifts associated with
the Great Moderation. It is important to emphasize that, in doing so, we
do not maintain that the US economy has not undergone relevant structural
changes other than those occurred in the structure of labor pay. By keeping
17all the parameters but ￿e ￿xed across periods, we try to ascertain the spe-
ci￿c ability of changes in labor pay in accounting for the shifting patterns of
macroeconomic correlations and volatilities.
In line with what is widely accepted in the literature, we calibrate the
discount factor, ￿, to a value of 0:99 and the elasticity of substitution among
di⁄erentiated goods, ￿, to a value of 6, which is consistent with a gross steady
state markup of 20 percent. The sticky price parameter, ￿, is calibrated equal
to 0:6, which implies an average price duration of three quarters, a value
consistent with the empirical evidence (see Sbordone, 2006). The degree of
external habit formation h is set equal to 0:6. As for the monetary policy
rule, we set ￿￿ = 1:2, in the range of values (1;5] that cover the empirically
plausible set conditional on having a unique equilibrium, and ￿y = 0:1. We
calibrate the elasticity of output with respect to e⁄ective labor input, ￿, to
a value of 2=3, and the labor adjustment cost parameter, ￿h, is set equal
to 1. We assume that the elasticity of the marginal disutility of e⁄ort with
respect to e⁄ort is equal to 1 (￿e = 1) and we calibrate ￿h to 1, in accordance
with Schor￿ s (1987) estimate of 0:5 for the elasticity of e⁄ort with respect to
hours,
￿h
1+￿e. The steady state balanced growth term ￿a is calibrated equal
to 1:004, consistent with the average quarterly output growth of 0:4 per
cent recorded in the U.S. data. Following Altig et al. (2005), Gertler et
al. (2008) and Juillard et al. (2008) we assume a trending nonstationary
AR(2) process for the level of technology, At, by setting ￿a = 0:5. The non-
technology disturbance term is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process
characterized by a ￿rst order autocorrelation parameter, ￿￿, equal to 0:9.
4.1 Performance related pay and Changes in the Struc-
ture of Conditional Correlations
The response of labor productivity to non-technology shocks
Figure 2a highlights that the response at impact (i.e. in the ￿rst period)
of labor productivity to a non-technology shock is monotonically strictly in-
creasing in ￿e and this holds true for any given value of ￿h. Hence, an
increase in the responsiveness of the real wage to economic conditions as-
sociated with a higher relevance of the performance-related component in
the cyclical ￿ uctuations of labor compensation lowers the procyclicality of
labor productivity conditional on non-technology shocks. When the share
of performance-related pay is su¢ ciently large, labor productivity becomes
18countercyclical.
Conversely, ￿gure 2b shows that high values of ￿h are associated with
countercyclical responses of labor productivity conditional on non-technology
shocks and labor productivity becomes procyclical as ￿h approaches to zero.
The response at impact of labor productivity to non-technology shocks is
therefore monotonically strictly decreasing with ￿h, regardless of the values
assigned to ￿e. In other words, an increase in the ￿ exibility of labor compen-
sation associated with a lower relative share of performance pay would imply
an increase in the degree of procyclicality of labor productivity conditional
on non-technology shocks.
The economic intuition behind this result is as follows. The apparent
feature of short run increasing returns to labor (SRIRL) derives from the
fact that ￿rms vary the intensity of their labor utilization over the cycle.
The extent to which this happens depends on the short run pro￿tability of
substituting increases in e⁄ort for increases in hours of work. Pro￿tability
depends on the structure of labor compensation and in particular on the
shares of the two compensation margins: following an increase in demand, the
smaller the increase in the compensation for e⁄ort, the more pro￿table it will
be to react to current and expected changes in the economy by varying labor
e⁄ort and the higher will be the degree of procyclicality of labor productivity.
To see this, consider the e¢ cient price frontier:
e v
r
t ￿ e w
r










(Etht+1 ￿ ht) (22)
Combining the e¢ cient price frontier with the aggregate production func-
tion yields the following expression for the cyclical component of labor pro-
ductivity:
g mpht = ￿(e w
r





￿h (ht ￿ ht￿1)￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿h (Etht+1 ￿ ht)
(23)
In the aftermath of a positive non-technology shock, both e⁄ort and hours
compensation tend to increase and, of course, so do hours. The previous
equation therefore highlights that the sign of the response of labor produc-
tivity, g mpht, to a non-technology shock depends on the relative movements
of the two compensation margins, e wr
t and e vr
t. Labor productivity can indeed
show a positive response to an expansionary non-technology shock if hours
19wages rise by more than the performance compensation. In other words, the
sign and the magnitude of labor productivity response depends crucially on
the interplay between the variations of the hourly wage and the performance
pay. Thus, the increase in the relevance of performance pay in the cyclical
￿ uctuations of labor compensation (i.e. a drop in ￿e) can indeed account
for the disappearance of the positive correlation between labor productivity
and hours conditional on non-technology shocks, that occurred in the early
1980s.
The response of hours to technology shocks
Figure 3a shows that (the absolute value of) the response at impact of hours
worked to technology improvements is monotonically strictly increasing in ￿e,
irrespective of the value assigned to the parameter ￿h. Conversely, Figure
3b highlights that (the absolute value of) the response at impact of hours
worked to technology improvements is monotonically strictly decreasing in
￿h, regardless of the value taken by the parameter ￿e.
The economic intuition is straightforward. The model predicts a negative
response of ￿rms￿use of labor input. Indeed, the negative response of labor
input to a technology expansion is theoretically consistent with a sticky price
economy in which monetary policy is not fully accommodative (Gal￿ 1999,
Basu et al. 2006, Dotsey, 2002 and Gal￿ and Rabanal, 2004).10 Following
a technology shock, both e⁄ort and hours compensation tend to rise. The
e¢ cient price frontier (22) implies that hours contraction will be larger the
higher is the increase in hourly wages (i.e. the lower is ￿h; see Riggi, 2010
and Riggi and Tancioni, 2010) and the smaller is the increase in performance
compensation (i.e. the higher is ￿e). Thus, for a given value of ￿h, an increase
in the ￿ exibility of labor compensation associated with an increase in the
relevance of performance pay (i.e. a lower ￿e) drives down the (absolute value
of the) negative correlation between hours and productivity conditional to a
technology shock, because it induces ￿rms to reduce labor input by adjusting
on the performance side more than on the hours side.
10Following a technology improvement aggregate demand does not grow as much as it
would under price ￿ exibility and therefore the more productive ￿rms are able to satisfy
demand with fewer hours worked by employees.
20A calibration exercise
A natural question emerges about the required variation in ￿e necessary to
account for the changes in the structure of conditional correlations docu-
mented by GG (2009). The literature does not provide much guidance about
setting a value for ￿e and even less so for calibrating a value to the pre-1984
period and another one for the post-1984 period. We therefore perform a
calibration exercise to ￿nd the values of ￿e that minimize the distance be-
tween the theoretical, model-based IRFs and the empirical SVAR-based av-
erage IRFs of labor productivity and hours to non-technology and technology
shocks, respectively. The empirical IRFs are those estimated by GG (2009)
and depicted in Figures 1a and 1b. We set ￿h = 0:7 in order to capture the
high degree of labor compensation rigidities documented for the pre-1984 pe-
riod (Blanchard and Riggi, 2009), and we maintain the calibration discussed
above for the remaining parameters. The values of ￿e that provide the best
approximation of the empirical SVAR-based average IRFs are ￿e = 0:719
in the pre-1984 sample and ￿e = 0:274 in the post-1984 sample11. Given
the calibration for the other parameters this implies an increased relevance
of performance pay in workers average earnings of more than 16 percent.12
Figures 4a and 4b report the theoretical IRFs.
This exercise highlights that the developments occurred in the design of
labor compensation, leading to a higher relevance of performance related
pay in the cyclical ￿ uctuations of wages, go a long way in accounting for
the changes in the pattern of conditional comovements among output, hours,
and labor productivity. Consistent with the empirical ￿ndings, our model
predicts that an increase in the performance pay sensitivity implies a change
from positive to negative of the sign of labor productivity response to non-
technology innovations and a drop in absolute value of the negative response
of hours to technology shocks.
11The standard deviation of the estimated value of ￿e in the pre-1984 is 0.0212. The
standard deviation of the estimated value of ￿e in the post-1984 is 0.0196.
12Indeed, given the calibration of the other parameters, the two values of ￿e imply an
increase in
f V r
g W r+f V r from to 0:432 to 0:503. See the Appendix on steady state calculations.
214.2 Performance pay and Changes in the Structure of
Unconditional Second Moments
Stiroh (2009) and GG argue that a substantial fraction of the decline in out-
put volatility characterizing the Great Moderation period can be explained by
the relevant decline in the correlation between labor productivity and hours.
In order to analyze the implications of the changes in the structure of labor
compensation for macroeconomic unconditional correlations and volatilities,
we use arti￿cial data generated from our model economy in which both tech-
nology and non-technology shocks are present. In particular, we consider
the two values of ￿e obtained in the previous calibration exercise: 0.719 and
0.274. For each parameterization, we extract randomly 1,000 samples of 100
observations each from the arti￿cial dataset, compute second moments and
average them across the 1,000 samples.13 To appraise the ability of the in-
creased performance pay sensitivity to account for the observed changes in
macroeconomic correlations and volatilities, we keep the remaining parame-
ters ￿xed at the calibrated values previously described in this section.
The ￿rst panel of table 1 shows the evidence by GG (2009) on the observed
shift in macroeconomic correlations between output, labor productivity and
hours. The second panel of table 1 reports the variations in the cyclical co-
movements between output and hours, hours and productivity, and output
and productivity computed on the arti￿cial data generated within our model
by assuming that the change in ￿e had been the sole structural change oc-
curred in the economy. The comparison between the model-based changes
in cross correlations and the corresponding observed changes reported in the
￿rst panel reveals that the structural change on which we are focusing can
account for the shifts in the comovements among macroeconomic variables.
The correlation between output and hours is stable across the two subsam-
ples, as documented by GG. Conversely, the procyclical behaviour of labor
productivity seems to vanish when we turn to the post-1984 sample. In-
deed, when we take output as a cyclical indicator, in the second sub-sample
labor productivity becomes an essentially acyclical variable. In particular,
GG document that the unconditional correlation between labor productivity
and business output drops to 0:03 from a value of 0:61. In our analysis we
document that, when ￿e takes a lower value, such correlation drops to 0:03
13The sample length of 100 quarters is empirically reasonable since it broadly resembles
the period associated with the Great Moderation (from 1984:1 onwards) and the pre-Great
Moderation period (from 1948:1 to 1983:4).
22(from a value of 0:95). By taking hours worked as a cyclical indicator labor
productivity becomes a coutercyclical variable. Indeed, GG report that the
actual correlation shifts from 0:18 to ￿0:46 and our model predicts a shift
from 0:90 to ￿0:38.
In table 2 we compare the evidence provided by GG and Gal￿ and van
Rens (2010) on the changes in the volatility of output and other variables
with our results from arti￿cial data when we vary the parameter ￿e. On its
own, the increased performance sensitivity of pay accounts for a sizeable part
of the drop in output volatility documented in the literature on the Great
Moderation. GG report that the standard deviation of B-P ￿ltered output
declines by about 53 per cent in the post-1984 period and our model predicts
a reduction of 22 percent when ￿e is set at the lower value.14 GG also report
a decline in the volatility of labor productivity and hours but they emphasize
that it is less pronounced than that of output. Our model-based data, on
the contrary, indicate that the standard deviation of labor productivity and
hours has increased, rather than decreased (although to a small extent in the
case of hours).15
The increase in the volatility of labor compensation in real terms, driven
by the higher performance sensitivity of pay and measured by a shift in
the standard deviation from 1:82 to 2:63, is consistent with the empirical
evidence reported in Gal￿ and Van Rens (2010) for the US economy, which
shows a sizeable increase in the volatility of actual (real) wages over the post-
1984 period. When they consider compensation per hour de￿ ated using the
compensation de￿ ator from the BLS Labor Productivity and Cost (LPC)
program and transformed using the B-P ￿lter on the (log of) variable, the
14In our model economy, we calibrate the standard deviation of the two shocks so as to
obtain - in the high ￿e case - a standard deviation of output that is exactly equal to the
actual standard deviation of output in the pre-1984 sample.
15The increase in the unconditional volatility of hours worked is explained by the contri-
bution of non-technology shocks. If the compensation for e⁄ort becomes less rigid (i.e. ￿e
shrinks), while the compensation for hours is as rigid as before (i.e. ￿e stays unchanged),
then following a demand shock it is pro￿table for ￿rms to react by adjusting on the hours
margin to a larger extent than before. This of course implies that the volatility of hours is
expected to rise. By contrast, the increase in the unconditional volatility of labor produc-
tivity is mainly driven by the contribution of technology shocks. If the compensation for
e⁄ort becomes less rigid, in the aftermath of a technology shock the variation (in absolute
value) of performance pay relatively to the variation of hourly wage tends to be higher
than before and this induces a smaller adjustment of hours worked and a larger variation
of worker￿ s performance. This implies an increase in the volatility of labor productivity.
23standard deviation shifts from 0:71 to 0:99 for the pre- and post-1984 periods.
We believe that this ￿nding ought to be emphasized as it stands in contrast
with the overall, parallel decline of macroeconomic volatility.16
5 The role of hours adjustment costs
A common explanation for the procyclical behavior of labor productivity is
labor hoarding, which is caused by a variety of costs involved in adjusting the
labor force. Since the latter cannot be costlessly adjusted in the short run,
￿rms react to changes in demand by varying the intensity of labor utilization.
Thus, the labor force is smoothed over the cycle, and the cyclical variations in
labor e⁄ort, which increases in booms and decreases in recessions, generate a
perception of SRIRL (Sbordone, 1996). It follows that a straightforward in-
terpretation of the decline in the correlation between labor productivity and
hours, conditional on non-technology shocks, would be based on the decrease
of labor adjustment costs over the recent decades, due to higher competition,
a more ￿ exible labor market and tougher corporate governance. By devel-
oping a theoretical model, Gal￿ and van Rens (2010) point to the decline in
labor market frictions as the major source of the vanishing procyclicality of
labor productivity.
In our model economy, this interpretation is captured by a decrease in
the value of the parameter ￿h. The role of ￿h in shaping the procyclical-
ity of labor productivity is highlighted by equation (23) which establishes
that higher labor adjustment costs renders the SRIRL outcome more likely.
Accordingly, Figure 5a shows that a downward shift of ￿h, taking up dif-
ferent values ranging from 2 to zero, yields a gradual disappearance of the
procyclical response of labor productivity to non-technology shocks. Indeed,
the response at impact of labor productivity to a non-technology shock is
monotonically strictly increasing in ￿h, regardless of the parameterization
used for ￿e.
However, the drop in labor hoarding driven by lower adjustment costs
16As a robustness inspection of the results documented in Tables 1 and 2, we have
veri￿ed whether the values of the unconditional moments computed on the arti￿cial data
may depend on initial conditions. To tackle this issue we have eliminated the ￿rst 100
observations from the overall sample of 10000 observations and extracted randomly, as
before, 1,000 samples of 100 observations each from this revised arti￿cial dataset. The
results remain virtually unchanged.
24would lead to an even larger initial drop in hours following a technology
innovation, in contrast with the evidence in GG and the results of our SVAR-
based IRFs. Figure 5b shows that the response at impact of hours worked
to technology improvements is, in general, monotonically strictly declining
(in absolute value) in the adjustment cost parameter, ￿h. Intuitively, hours
response to a technology shock would be lower the higher are the hours
adjustment costs.
Of course the inability of the decrease in labor adjustment costs to ac-
count on its own for both changes in the dynamic responses to shocks does
not rule out the potential relevance that decreasing labor market frictions
may have had for the Great Moderation. For example, the drop in labor
adjustment costs combined with a stronger anti-in￿ ationary stance of the
monetary policy could make a good job in explaning the Great Moderation
and the parallel shifts in macroeconomic correlations.
6 Conclusions
Gal￿ and Gambetti (2009) show that large changes in the patterns of condi-
tional and unconditional correlations among output, hours and labor produc-
tivity have accompanied the substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility
experienced by the US economy since the mid-1980s.
In this paper we have proposed a novel explanation for these observed
patterns based on extensive evidence showing that the U.S. design of labor
compensation has changed around the mid-1980s, towards an increased ￿ ex-
ibility of workers￿pay combined with a greater relevance of the performance-
pay component in the cyclical ￿ uctuations of labor compensation.
Using stochastic simulations, we have showed that a structural change
towards an increased ￿ exibility in real wages associated with a higher share
of the performance-related component in workers compensation can account
for the following empirical patterns: a) the disappearance of the procycli-
cal productivity puzzle; b) the smaller contractionary e⁄ects on hours of a
technology improvement; c) the decline in the unconditional correlation be-
tween labor productivity and both output and hours; d) the decline in output
volatility and e) the parallel increase in the volatility of real wage.
We have also showed that if the higher wage ￿ exibility had been accom-
panied by a lower share of the performance-related component in workers
compensation we would have implications for the patterns of comovements
25which go in the opposite direction to those that emerge from empirical analy-
sis.
The evidence by GG and Gal￿ and van Rens (2010) is useful to shed light
on the merits of di⁄erent explanations for the Great Moderation. We do not
claim that the shift in the design of labor compensation is the sole structural
change behind the complex picture associated with the Great Moderation.
However, our goal is to emphasize that the developments occurred in the
design of labor compensation, leading to a higher relevance of performance-
related pay in the cyclical ￿ uctuations of wages, have played a key role in
explaining the enhanced macroeconomic stability and the parallel shift in the
structure of macroeconomic correlations.
On the other hand, the explanation of shifts in macroeconomic correla-
tions based on modi￿cations to pay settings is particularly appealing as it
can be reconciled with an empirical puzzle highlighted by Davis and Kahn
(2008), namely that the substantial slump in the volatility of aggregate real
activity has been coincident with an increase in individual income volatility
and earnings uncertainty (see also Comin and Mulani, 2006). Arguably, these
opposite trends in micro and macro volatility are potentially consistent with
a higher incidence of the performance-related component of labor compensa-
tion, that rewards idiosyncratic e⁄ort and individual worker characteristics.
We therefore see two natural directions for future research. First, an ex-
tension to the model by allowing for heterogeneous consumers to investigate
the coincidence between changes in the structure of macroeconomic corre-
lations and the increased volatility of earnings at the individual level; and
second, a structural estimation of the model.
26Appendix
Steady state calculation
As it is standard in the literature, we normalize H to be equal to one (see,
e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007). In order to compute the performance pay
share on workers labor compensation, we need to recover the steady state
value of E. To this aim, we combine the cost minimization condition with
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By solving the polinomial equation, we recover the steady state value of E;
which depends on ￿e (among the other parameters) and we are able to study
how the performance pay share in workers labor compensation varies with
￿e. Indeed, the relative share of performance pay is equal to
f V r





or, equivalently, looking at the share from the supply side:
f V r





























27The value of the share obtained by plugging the model-consistent value of E
into(4A) coincides with the value obtained by plugging E into (5A). We are
thus able to recover the change in the ratio of performance pay to workers
labor compensation which is consistent with the variation in ￿e; suggested
by the minimum distance exercise presented in section 3.1 (main text).
28Figure 1a
The average responses of labor productivity to non-technology shocks












The average responses of hours to technology shocks













Source: our replication of Gal￿ and Gambetti (2009)￿ results (see ￿gures
6.B and 7.B on pages 47-48 of their paper).
29Figure 2. Nontechnology Shocks: Response at impact of labor productivity
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Figure 3. Technology Shocks: Response at impact of hours
FIGURE 3a
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30Figure 4a. Nontechnology Shocks: Labor Productivity response
















Figure 4b. Technology Shocks: Hours response



















31Table 1 Changes in Cross Correlations
Evidence from GG (2009)
(table 3, pp. 31)
(BP-￿lter)
Second moments of arti￿cial
model-based data
(cyclical components)
Pre-1984 Post-1984 Change ￿e = 0:719 ￿e = 0:274 Change
Output, hours 0:89 0:86 ￿0:02 0:99 0:91 ￿0:08
Hours, productivity 0:18 ￿0:46 ￿0:65 0:90 ￿0:38 ￿1:28
Output, productivity 0:61 0:03 ￿0:58 0:95 0:03 ￿0:92
Table 2 Changes in Volatility
Evidence from
GG and Gal￿-Van Rens (2010)
Standard Deviation
(BP-￿lter)




Pre-1984 ￿e = 0:719 ￿e = 0:274 Post-1984
Pre-1984
Output 2:59 1:23 0:47 2:59 2:02 0:78
Hours 2:08 1:39 0:67 1:94 2:19 1:12
Productivity 1:18 0:68 0:57 0:69 0:87 1:26
Wage 0:71 0:99 1:38 1:82 2:63 1:44
32Figure 5. The role of hours adjustment costs
FIGURE 5a. Non technology shocks
Response at impact of labor productivity
























FIGURE 5b. Technology shocks
Response at impact of hours
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